

# Papers of International Conference On Two Hundred Years After Kant

(November 20-22, 2004 / Tehran-Iran)

By  
Department of Philosophy,  
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# A Critical Evaluation Of Ghazzalian And Kantian Notions Of Mysticism And Intuition, An Islamic Perspective

Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman\*

## Abstract

*This research is an attempt to study the relationship between the Ghazzalian and Kantian thoughts on mysticism and intuition from an Islamic perspective. This study is intelligible when it is remembered that after Al-Ghazzali, mysticism in Islam was not the same again and even though, Kant was not a Mystic in the real sense of the word but his mystical notions appear similar to that of al-Ghazzali on many points especially on mystical metaphysics. The study begins by tracing the concept and development of mysticism in Islam. It also enumerates some of the Muslim scholars who brought about reconciliation between mainstream Islam or orthodoxy and philosophical Sufism. One of whom and certainly the most famous and acknowledged in the West is al-Imam al Ghazzali. In addition, the study has traced the historical background of both the Ghazzalian and Kantian philosophical and metaphysical thoughts vis-à-vis mysticism and intuition. It also unravels both the post Kantian and Ghazzalian trends in mysticism and intuition. In doing, it has attempted to explain some metaphysical concepts germane to their thoughts on mysticism as popularly understood in the Ghazzalian and Kantian schools. It finally ends up revealing that today mysticism has become a euphemism for both laxity and licentiousness. Most mystics today hide behind their esoteric teachings to call for total or unwarranted liberalization of religious observances in the name of promoting religious*

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*understanding. As a result, there is perennial conflict in the philosophical mystical camps. The study therefore opines that it is the premonition of this problem that accounted for Kantian skepticism and Ghazzalian demolition of philosophy.*

\* \* \*

## Background To The Study

In order to examine Ghazzalian and Kantian thoughts on mysticism from an Islamic perspective, it is important to understand the meaning and essence of mysticism in Islam, trace its origin and development as well as some of its major proponents and their efforts to bring it into conformity with Islamic orthodoxy. The term mysticism is derived from the Greek verb *muo*, which means silence or closing of the lips. Sufism is the term for mysticism in Islam and is related to the *Batin* which implies "inward", "inner" and "hidden". Sufis therefore see themselves first of all as the noble guardians of *Asrar* or Divine mysteries. It is by its confidential nature meant only for an elected few.<sup>1</sup> In this sense Sufism differs from Fiqh which is concerned with public religious practice of the Muslims.

In the light of the light of the above, Maududi, refers to Sufism as the other side of Fiqh because while the former deals with the esoteric and inner dimension of Muslim worship, the latter deals with the external dimension of this worship.<sup>2</sup> This view is well expounded upon by al- Ghazzali in the *Ihyau 'ulum al-din*. It is also related to the element of Divine love or *mahabbah* shared among His servants, not individualistic or sentimental. As explained by al-Ghazzali, a true Sufi loves only God most High while loving others because of his love of the Almighty and Sublime God. This love of God implies absolute trust and confidence in God or *tawwakul* and the true Sufi gives himself up to God "like a corpse in the hands of a corpse washer."<sup>3</sup>

Sufism is also understood by Sufis as a path of Gnosticism or *al-ma'rifah*. This explains why the Islamic mysticism has had a close relationship with philosophy especially Shiite mysticism.<sup>4</sup> For instance, al-Farabi, who was also inclined towards a Sufi life, was the first celebrated Islamic philosopher. Ibn Sina is another famous Islamic philosopher who was greatly influenced by Sufism especially in his "*al-hikmat al-mashriqiyyah*". In fact, chapter nine of his "al-Isharat wat-tanbihat"- which is still taught in Persia-, contains a strong advocacy of the attainment of the ultimate truth by Gnostics through the Sufi path. In short both Islamic philosophers and Sufis have been concerned with the search for the ultimate truth especially in the Twelve-*Imamiyyah* and *Ismai'liyyah* schools.<sup>5</sup> Ibn Sina's notable student, Shihab ad-Din al-Suhrawardi created a new synthesis

of Islamic philosophy and Gnosticism. A Sufi right from his youth, al-Suhrawardi later went on to master the philosophy of ibn Sina. He then propounded a novel philosophical theory on the attainment of knowledge through illumination and became the founder of the school of illumination or *al-ishraq*. Mullah Sadra further developed this school.

Sufism can also be perceived as a form of quietism as demonstrated by Imam al-Ghazzali who stigmatized any form of revolt even if it is against an unjust and tyrannical ruler. He went further to support the Caliphate and recognized the legitimacy of the Abbasids and even sanctioned its suppression of any revolt against its authority.<sup>6</sup> This could have been induced by his philosophical interpretation of the relationship between the mystic goal of reform and political stability. Indeed, no reform can duly take place in an environment characterized by wars and crises. Consequently, many Sufis tend to reject in its totality the concept of Jihad while they call for reform and restoration of the human conscience because the reform of the hearts needs peace and stability in order for it to be effective and lasting.

At a stage in the history of Sufism, many Sufis strove to bring about a coherent harmonization between Sufi practices and Islamic law and they adopted the Qur'an and Sunnah as their guiding principles. Their focus was the arcane dimensions of Sufism, its accessibility and conformity with Islamic orthodoxy. The *Kitab al-ri'ayan* (Book of consideration) by Abu Abdillah al-Harith ibn Asad al-Muhasibi, who worked in Baghdad and Basra, was one of the first manuals written for a Sufi disciple. He expounded upon the examination of the conscience as an effective tool for spiritual advancement and purification.

Other books include *Kitab al-luma'* (Books of Concise Remarks) by Abu Nasr Abdillah ibn Ali al-Sarraj, *Kitab al-ta'rruf* (Book of knowledge) by Abu Bakr Muhammad al-Kalabadhi, the *Qut al-qulub* (Nourishment of the Heart) and the *Kash al-mahjub* (Unveiling of the veiled) by Hujweree Ali ibn 'Uthman. Abu al-Qasim 'Abdul Karim al-Qushayri also wrote his *al-Risalah al-Qushayriyah*, another manual in the Sufi path. All the works went a great length in revealing the legitimacy of Sufism. As *Asharite* scholars, the authors proved that it was in tune with *Asharite* theology citing profusely from the Qur'an, Hadith and other legal traditions. One other effort that is regarded as the culmination of the attempt to bring Sufism into conformity with legal rulings is that of Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazzali.

### **Short Biographies Of Al-Ghazzali And Kant**

Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazzali was born at Tus, a city in Khurasan in Persia in 450/1058 and received a very good traditional education first at Jurjan and later Nishapur the provincial capital where he

learnt the main principles of *Ash'arite* Kalam at the feet of Imam *al-Haramayn* Abu al-Ma'ali al-Juwayni. He held the *Ash'arite* beliefs of the Unity of God, the reality of Divine attributes distinguished from the essence of God, the eternity of the Qur'an, Seeing the face of God by the blessed in Paradise, the supremacy of revelation over reason and the legitimacy of the succession of the *Khulafa ar-rashidun*. Owing to his conformity with the legal rulings of the Shari'ah, al-Ghazzali also upheld an anti-Batinite position at a time when the *Ismaili* state was still very strong in *Fatimid* Cairo and spreading like fire through out the Middle East. He devoted a lot of his energy to the critique of *Ismailism* and its *Batinite* absurdities. Some of his works devoted to this task included *Fada'ih al-batinyyah wa fada'il al-mustazhiriyyah*. He attacked the *Batinite* heretical innovations of *taqlid* or submission to the authoritarian teachings of their Imams in lieu of the Prophetic Sunnah that is the only necessary guide after the book of Allah.<sup>7</sup>

Al-Ghazzali eventually abdicated his professorial position in Baghdad in 488 because to a spiritual crisis and went into concealment in Syria and Palestine. During the period he devoted himself exclusively to Sufi life and performed pilgrimage to Mecca. He became convinced that he had a divine mandate to carry out the revivalism of Islam for his epoch.<sup>8</sup> He later returned to his professorial position in 499 only to retire two years later before he died in 505. Before his death, al-Ghazzali succeeded in effecting reconciliation between Sufism and the mainstream of Islam. He argued that the mystical experience is the highest form of knowledge when compared to philosophy and theology. This he stated clearly in his *Munqidh minad dalal* where he explained that despite his juristic and philosophical apprehension he was still in need of mystical illumination.<sup>9</sup>

Al-Ghazzali went ahead to analyze in dept the various stages and states that makes up the Sufi path. He also provided the manner of training that can aid the Sufi to gain control over the lower soul (*nafs al-ammarah bi su'*). He explained that true Sufism starts from knowledge of God and His attributes, observing religious obligations like prayers and pilgrimage followed by the avoidance of unlawful and prohibited vices like love of worldly things. According to him these unlawful practices can remove the *murid* or novice from the Sufi path while practices like asceticism, repentance and fear of Allah will sustain him on the path. This is so because the conduct of a true Sufi implies a silent satisfaction with God's decree.<sup>10</sup> According to al-Ghazzali, it is only after attaining the best possible disposition that a *murid* can start his proper journey to God. It begins with the sincere intention or *niyyah* to approach God followed by the continuous remembrance of God's name or *dhikr* which leads to the total annihilation of human weaknesses and immersion in God known as *fana*. Al-Ghazzali differentiates between this



ecstatic moment and *hulul* or incarnation of God. He believes this moment of *fana* is very short and should be devoid of theophatic utterances and acts of Shirk or polytheism.<sup>11</sup>

As for Kant, he was a Prussian philosopher born in Konigsberg and started his life pursuing academic distinction but did not complete his doctoral thesis by which he qualified to teach in a German university, until 1755, when he was already 31 years old. Prior to that he made his living as a tutor but was only paid by the students. This Kantian early life as a tutor however improved when he was later appointed to a regular chair of philosophy, at age 46. Nevertheless, Kant had already made a name for himself with his original ideas in physics and astronomy and with his growing critique of the widely accepted thought of "The First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space," which upheld Newtonian arguments against Leibniz's denial of the existence of space.

The "Inaugural Dissertation" that significant work was his first attempt at analyzing the distinguishing characteristics of a critique of Philosophy. The trilogy constitutes his most important works but the writing of the 'Critique of Pure Reason', which was the first of the three, took more than ten years. And its publication in 1781 made Kant, at age 57, achieved the beginning of his academic plan but his age and health, it appeared would hinder and slow the pace of its completion. His concern that he might actually die before finishing his work, in an age when sudden death was an all too familiar phenomenon, spurred him on and he focused his whole time, attention and efforts with unyielding determination on the work at the expense of his friendship, family companionship and socialization and entertainment with all his acquaintances. About this Kantian experience, Ernst Cassirer wrote quoting what Rink says:

"Kant in his early years spent almost every midday and evening outside his house in social activities, frequently taking part also in a card party and only getting home around midnight. If he was not busy at meals, he ate in the inn at a table sought out by a number of cultured people."<sup>12</sup>

According to Johann George Hermann, Kant had in his head a host of works lined up than he could probably ever have completed in the "whirl of social distractions" in which he was involved at the time. He therefore abandoned this "whirl of social distractions" for his works. He sacrificed this "whirl of social distractions" at the halter of his writing with dogged discipline that surprised most of his intimate friends and colleagues. It appeared as if he was really racing against death<sup>13</sup> As it eventually turned out, he was able to accomplish his plan before death could struck he succeeded in producing the key monuments of the Critical Philosophy and the trilogy of his Critiques his faculties diminished and his pen was stilled. It

was not death but his declining faculties that finally stilled his pen, before he actually passed away. He employed his knowledge of the history of nations and peoples, natural sciences, logic mathematics, and his vast experience sources to enrich his work and enliven his lecture.<sup>14</sup>

### **A Critical Evaluation Of Their Mysticism And Intuition**

Al- Gazzali is a celebrated authority on Islamic mysticism, theology, jurisprudence and philosophy; His *maqasid al-falasifah* was an exposition of the main philosophical issues of his time objectively. His assimilation and mastery of philosophy was so deep so much that it had influence on his mystical thoughts. While fighting against the dialectical contradictions in philosophy, his theology and mysticism had a logical theoretical basis. He argued that philosophy cannot solely ensure the truth because it does not produce the absolute truth and certainty and accused it of making great compromises in its own methodology. He explained in *Munqidh minad dalal* that in applying logic, philosophers usually draw some conditions to be fulfilled in order to ensure certainty but later relax these conditions when it comes to religious issues.<sup>15</sup> To him logic based on the necessary relationship between premises and their conclusions is not satisfying to the mind and the heart. True Knowledge is the product of divine illumination (*ilham*) because when God nurtures the heart and lightens the breasts of men, the mystery of the spiritual realm becomes revealed showing the true reality of things while removing ignorance. In *Tahafut al-falasifah*, the Imam responds to the incoherence of the philosophers, most of whom he accused of atheism unlike their predecessors, and refutes twenty of their claims which include emanation and eternity theories or the ideas that the world had no beginning and will have no end, denial of Divine attributes, knowledge of generals, divisibility into genus and differentia, impossibility of departure from natural course, and annihilation of souls, resurrection, bodily pleasures and pains.<sup>16</sup>

On three of these, he explains that they can be considered infidels.

Here it must be stressed that Al-Ghazzali does not deny the existence of natural causality but the existence of a necessary connection devoid of God's will. He precedes David Hume in asserting that the nexus of causality is only an apparent effect of human custom of linking together two occurrences and it is the regularity of this *adah* that implants in human minds that the two cannot be separated.<sup>17</sup> In reality, according to him, God is the acting cause of effects like burning and not fire through His direct intervention or that of His agents. God has created in us the Knowledge that he will not always bring about everything that is possible or every time for nothing is impossible for Him. He also explains that religious scriptures cannot judge natural sciences.

Whoever interprets them with the literal meaning of the Qur'an and Sunnah will damage religion.<sup>18</sup> He listed philosophical sciences as six, mathematics, logic, metaphysics or theology, ethics, politics and natural science. But not all philosophical arguments are cogent logical and reliable hence dispute between religion and philosophy. He wrote *Iqtisad fi al-'Itiqad* as a proof of religious creeds based on Aristotelian logic. He explains the importance of beliefs in God, His Attributes, Qualities, Deeds, Prophethood and eschatology. He was the first theologian that employs logic to explain beliefs devoid of legal jargons hence Ibn Khaldun considers him as the founder of this tendency. He explains in the *Tahafut* that logic is the prerogative of the philosophers but an art of Kalam or dialectic al Jadal. He uses such logical thinking as every originated being requires a cause for its origination, the world is originated therefore has a cause, any masterpiece proceeds from a master and powerful agent, the world is a masterwork hence proceeds from a powerful agent. He considered theoretical certainty as the result of the highest form of knowledge which is revelation.<sup>19</sup> Following the above al-Ghazzali turned the *Ash'arite* Kalam into the dialectical and philosophical basis of his religious revival and mystical reflection. He joined the court of Nizam al-Mulk in 478 and became the *Shafi'ite* jurist in the *Madrasah Nizamiyyah* in Baghdad in 484 and an intellectual of the court which made him appreciate the corruption of the depraved Kings and Sultans and the compromises of the *Ulama and fuqaha*.<sup>20</sup>

To Kant himself, only God has an intellectual intuition. Though it is believed that he has no interest in mysticism,<sup>21</sup> yet mysticism is in Kantian philosophy. According to Kantian philosophy any kind of mysticism is an immediate knowledge that is an intuitive understanding that unlike a discursive understanding is immediate and unarticulated. No doubt this shows clearly that Kant agrees that mysticism is an entity of intuitive understanding that stands on its own as a ground for substantive truths in the divine realm only and is not a source of knowledge from our human angle. This is what is to be found and can be said to exist in Kantian mysticism. Other forms of intuitionism may claim intuitive understanding *prior* to discursive but not Kant yet mysticism is very much Kantian. Kantian notion is premised on a wall separating the phenomenal or objects as they are perceived and the noumenal or objects as they actually exist independent of human knowledge. He strongly submits that people only know the appearances of things and not the things as they are in reality *Ding an sich* because they are beyond our human perception.<sup>22</sup> This notion is a delimitation of the Kantian epistemology of knowledge and it implies that humans cannot grasp the noumenal but rather can only understand the

phenomenal that is based on human limited preconceptions and biases. This is contrary to Ghazzalian notion of the numinous. Al-Ghazzali believed that the numinous could not only be felt and experienced by humans but could also be apprehended rationally by them. True Knowledge to him is the product of divine illumination (*ilham*) because when God nurtures the heart and lightens the breasts of men, the mystery of the spiritual realm becomes revealed showing the true reality of things while removing ignorance. In short, according to Ghazzalian thoughts, it is possible to for illuminated humans to access the noumenal or things the way they actually are.

While mysticism is a form of intuitionism, not all intuitionism is mysticism going by the above Kantian mysticism. Mysticism is intuitive knowledge of transcendent concrete objects that are not the phenomenal or material objects of ordinary perception. The mystic sees things that are not part of ordinary experience. According to Kant, transcendent objects cannot be understood because they cannot be regularly articulated. For Kant, a theory of transcendent objects ("dialectic") generates antinomies. Kant's theory may therefore allow for mystical knowledge that is not effable in concrete terms. This is rather like what many mystics say, since they gain knowledge that is ineffable and inexpressible. This is also true for al-Ghazzali mystical experience who insists that the mystical knowledge is real but at the same time in an attempt to communicate it to the non-initiated, the mystics cannot escape from committing heresies. The intuitive apprehension of abstract objects does not rise to the level of mysticism since abstract objects do not have independent existence. Intuitions of abstract objects concern meaning and the ordinary sense of "intuition" applies to this. Such intuitions, when analyzed, are the basis of analytic truths, but whether the meanings apply to existence is a separate question, which requires an evidentiary basis. Kant also holds the notion of moral law going by his philosophy of morality. He explains the moral intuition without any reference to a transcendental being. He cannot therefore be considered a mystic, since his God is not transcendent, but immanent, in all the objects of perception, and who does also submit to and is governed by the moral law. He is not beyond the control of moral law.<sup>23</sup> Only a sensible intuition could relate one to an independent transcendent object, since one who knows it clearly cannot create such a thing. However, if the mystic is identical to the transcendent object, this could allow for an intellectual intuition, depending on the metaphysics of the object. It is possible for God's existence to be presented to him passively, in which case he would have sensible knowledge of himself; or, God may actually create his own existence, like that of anything else, merely by knowing it.

This would be an intellectual intuition in a strong Kantian sense, and a form of mysticism, with the transcendence of the Pure Land, in which the

identity with the mystical object is facilitated by the absence of any substantial independence of things whatsoever. Similarly, the Tibetan "Book of the Dead" urges the deceased to realize that the visions of the hereafter are not independent but created by their own Mind. The natures of transcendent objects, to the extent that they can be theorized at all, are matters Kantian metaphysics which resolve some antinomies; and Kantian metaphysics tends to dismiss more substantive doctrine from historic religions (e.g. the Trinity, trans-substantiation). Kantian theory of the "numinous" is an abstraction, whose existence is certified by its presence in the objects of experience, but which in an important way is not a natural property, since it is invisible to science and is unrelated to mundane utility. This forms the basis of the numinous as the central theme of all religions in the 'Idea of the Holy' by Rudolf Otto. He argues that there is no religion in which God does not exist as the real and innermost core.<sup>24</sup> But though the idea of the numinous is natural to Otto, but his God comes from the Kantian Ideas and divine his numinous derives from no more than a phenomenology of such religions. In Kantian epistemology and metaphysics, no rational or intelligible system can be built from mystical intuitions. To Kant the antinomian choices between metaphysics of the mystical intuitions as intellectual or sensible apprehension of independent or identical objects and the divine substance cannot be resolved on the mere evidence of a mystical knowledge, since the knowledge of different mystics confirm different apprehensions of the same objects and even the divine substance and the evidence of one tends to refute the evidence of the other. This in itself is one of the most important features of human existence, since it leaves us without any rational certainty that there are transcendent objects at all. The mystics could as well be hallucinating, whether beholding the presence of celestial Beings or visualizing the divine presence itself.

In Kant's theory, complications arise over Kant's original conception of intuition because, as considered by Kant, perception itself comes to be seen in the transcendental deduction as a product of mental activity. Since perception is supposed to be of an active mental synthesis between intuition and thought; but since this synthesis is an activity that cannot occur in the conscious mind then intuition is not lost. There is also the ontological aspect to this, that the phenomenal objects immanent in our perception can be both real and external on the one hand and subjective and internal on the other hand. In arguments about mathematics theories, "intuitionism" tends to mean something else, which can be very confusing. Mathematical intuitionists don't like mathematical or logical constructions that cannot be visualized and disapproving of infinities. Empiricism therefore seemingly has had little effect on the practice of mathematics and if taken seriously, would make much of modern mathematics, suspect. While Kant might be said to be a

kind of intuitionist in this sense, since he thinks that the axioms of geometry and arithmetic are grounded by visualization, there is nothing to prevent the logical extension of mathematics beyond our capacity for visualization, which in fact is what has occurred. While Kant's mathematics is somewhat intuitionist in the modern mathematical sense, it is not necessarily int

uitionist in the traditional epistemic sense, since our mathematical "intuitions can be wrong.

Another Kantian original contribution to philosophy is that knowledge depends on the structure of the mind and not on the world and that it has no connection to the world and is not even true representation, just a solipsistic fantasy. Kant seems threatened with the doctrine that all humans can apprehend is human psychological perceptions and biases but not noumenal, objective and external things. Kant believed that the rational structure of the mind reflects the rational structure of the world and of external things not as they exist in themselves. Kant's theory manages to provide, a phenomenal reality of a sphere for science that was distinct and separate from anything that would relate to morality or religion. The endless confusion and conflict that still results from people trying to figure out whether or not and how science and religion should fit together is deftly avoided by Kant, who can say, for instance, that God and divine creation cannot be part of any truly scientific theory because both involve "unconditioned" realities, while science can only deal with conditioned realities.

Similarly, Kant can be a phenomenal determinist with science yet simultaneously allow for free will in a way that involves obscurities that no one has been able to illuminate. Kantian theory prevents psychological explanations for behavior being used to excuse moral responsibility and accountability. Thus, the tragic childhood of a person however touching cannot excuse crimes committed by that person in full knowledge of the implications and consequences of such crimes. His approach is of comparative interest because of similar philosophical distinction between conditioned realities, which mostly means the world of experience, and unconditioned realities which interestingly include, not only the sphere of salvation, but also space, a form imposed *a priori* on experience by the mind. The problems that must be sorted out with Kant are formidable. Most important is the confusion that results from Kant mixing together two entirely different theories. The first theory is that the fundamental activity of the mind, called "synthesis," is an activity of human thought that applies certain concepts to a previously given perceptual datum from experience as found in the "Critique of Pure Reason". Thus, Kant still says, "Since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearance would none the less present objects to our intuitions".<sup>25</sup>

Kant realized that "synthesis" would have to produce, not just a structure

of thought, but also the entire structure of consciousness within which perception also occurs. Thus he says, "What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness, it is called perception. It is the structure of consciousness, through synthesis, that turns "appearances" into objects and perceptions, without which they would be nothing."<sup>26</sup>

Consequently Kant made synthesis a function of 'imagination' rather than thought, as a bridge between thought and perception, though this creates its own confusions. This move occurs because Kant hits upon the idea that synthesis produced the unity that we actually find in "in the unity of consciousness". Everything we know, think, see, feel, remember, etc. belongs to our consciousness in one temporal stream of experience. Synthesis therefore brings things into consciousness, making it possible for us to subsequently recognize that our consciousness exists and that there are things in it. In order to resolve the paradoxes of this Kantian theory, it must be recalled that Kant believed that reason connects us directly to things and that Kant did not support Cartesian theory of hidden and transcendent objects, but empirical realism, that we are directly acquainted with real objects. Kantian notion therefore does not allow for speculative metaphysics as practiced by the rationalists because reason alone does not determine any positive content of knowledge but allows for two sources of sources of knowledge that produce the perception of phenomenal objects.

Because of, the paradox of his thought, much of philosophy in recent times has been a mess of Kantian confusing theory. The idea that the mind produces the world it knows conspicuously turns up in modern and postmodern theories that view all realities as "socially constructed". These all produce a fundamental paradox that was avoided by Kant, for they are all relativistic and subjectivist denials that knowledge even exists, which nevertheless maintain that this circumstance is a fact that can be known and demonstrated with some certainty. The "Transcendental Logic" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is divided into the "Transcendental Analytic" and the "Transcendental Dialectic." The "Dialectic" is concerned with the fallacies produced when metaphysics is extended beyond possible experience. For Descartes, any notion that could be conceived "clearly and distinctly" could be used without hesitation or doubt, a procedure familiar and unobjectionable in mathematics. It was the Empiricists who started demanding certificates of authenticity, since they wanted to trace all knowledge back to experience. Locke was not aware, that not everything familiar from traditional philosophy was going to be so traceable; and Berkeley's pious rejection of "material substance" lit a skeptical fuse whose detonation would shake much of subsequent philosophy through Hume, thanks in great measure to Kant's appreciation of the importance of the issue.

Thus, Kant begins, like Hume, asking about the legitimacy of concepts.

However, the traditional Problem has already insensibly been brought up; for in his critique of the concept of cause and effect, Hume did question the *principle* of causality, a proposition, and the way in which he expressed the defect of such a principle uncovered a point to Kant, which he dealt with back in the Introduction to the *Critique*, not in the "Transcendental Logic" at all. Hume had decided that the lack of certainty for cause and effect was because of the nature of the relationship of the two events, or of the subject and the predicate, in a proposition. In *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Hume made a distinction about how subject and predicate could be related. While some philosophers spent much of the 20th Century congratulating Hume for having discovered that causality might not exist, they never seem to have noticed that he explicitly denied having done anything of the sort. Kant already knew the type, who "were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting..."<sup>27</sup>

Kant's solution to the *quid juris* in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was the argument of the "Transcendental Deduction" (in the "Analytic of Concepts") that concepts like causality are "conditions of the possibility of experience," because they are the rules by which perception and experience are united into a single consciousness, through a mental activity called "synthesis." Once the existence of consciousness is conceded, then whatever is necessary for the existence of consciousness must be conceded?

Kant gave us the real elements of the solution of the Problem of First Principles, even though he could not complete and seal the matter himself. Indeed, no one can hope to do that, even as new elements and new understanding of the solution emerge over time. The term 'principle' [*Prinzips*] is ambiguous, and commonly signifies any knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] which can be used as a principle [*Prinzips*], although in itself, and as regards its proper origin [*Ursprung*], it is no principle. Every universal proposition, even one derived from experience, through induction [*Induktion*], can serve as major premise [*Obersatz*] in a syllogism; but it is not therefore itself a principle [*Principium*].<sup>28</sup> The obscurity of his theory of empirical realism and transcendental idealism is largely due to his terminology and the difficulties of reconciling parts of his theory. Since "transcendental" is contrasted with "empirical," the two terms are epistemological and mean "independent of (i.e. transcending) experience" and "immanent in experience." Since "realism" is contrasted with "idealism," those two terms are ontological and mean "independent of my existence" and "dependent on my existence." However, using the strict definitions, "transcendental idealism" means something else, "transcendental idealism" would have to mean knowledge of objects that are dependent on my



existence but independent of my experience. This seems to be, not just a paradox, a contradiction, since if something exists as an epiphenomenon of myself, it hardly seems like it could be independent of my experience.

## **Conclusion**

In this work, an attempt has been made to offer a comparison between the main themes of Imam al-Ghazzali and Emmanuel Kant mysticism and intuition especially within the framework of Sufism in Islam. The work has traced the concept, origin and emergence of Sufism in Islam as well as its nature, various developments and current trends. Though, today Sufism in most part of the Muslim world, West Africa inclusive has become a euphemism for both laxity and licentiousness as Sufis hide behind their esoteric teachings to call for total or unwarranted liberalization of religious observances in the name of promoting religious understanding, it is evident that Sufism still, they continue to enjoy a large following in postmodern society. Both Imam al-Ghazzali and Emmanuel Kant actually agreed that mysticism in its social transformations and adaptations to the exigencies of society may develop ineffable features which are not in accordance with high ethical standards.

## **Endnotes**

- 1 Thomas Patrick Hughes, ed. *The Dictionary of Islam*, p. 609.
- 2 A.A. Maududi, *Towards Understanding of Islam*, Lahore: 1989, p. 111.
- 3 A. al-Ghazzali, *Kitab al-arbain fi usul ad-din*, ed. M. Mustafa Abul-'Ala, Cairo: pp. 249- 257.
- 4 See S.H. Nasr, "The Relation between Sufism and Philosophy in Persian Culture" in *Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia*, ed. M. Aminrazavi, London: 1995.
- 5 See L. Sherrard, *Trans. A History of Islamic Philophy*, London: 1993
- 6 A. Lambaton, *Theory and practice of Medieval Persian Government*, London: 1980.
- 7 A. al-Ghazzali, *Fada'ih al-batiniyyah wa fada'il al-mustazhiriyyah*, trans.R. J. McCarthy, *Freedom and Fulfilment*, Boston: 250, 1980.
- 8 A. Al-Ghazzali, *al- Munqidh minad dalal*, trans. W. M. Watt, *The Faith and Practice al-Ghazali*, London: 1967, 75..
- 9A. Al-Ghazzali, *al- Munqidh*, p. 55.
- 10 A. al-Ghazzali, *Kitab al-arbain*: 12, 51, 197, 205 and 211, 1970.
- 11 Al-Ghazzali, *Kitab al-arbain*, p.62.

- 12 James Haden, trans. *Kant's Life and Thought*, Yale University Press, 1981, pp.51-52
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Al-Ghazzali, *al-munqidh minad dalal*, trans. W.M. Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al- Ghazzali*, London, 1967, p. 36.
- 16 William Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Surveys: Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962, p. 44.).
- 17 See al-Ghazzali, *Tahafut al-Falasifah*, 1928: 285.
- 18 Ibid, 738
- 19 Al-Ghazzali, *al-munqidh* , 25
- 20 W.M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual: a Study of al Ghazzali*, Edinburgh, 1963.
- 21 See "Dreams of a Visionary, explained by Dreams of Metaphysics," 1766
- 22 Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1950), pp. 42-81.
- 23 See Immanuel Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Thomas Kingsmith Abbot, (New York: Prometheus Books Press, 1987).
- 24 Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (Oxford University Press, 1969), p.6.
- 25 ("A" 90-91, Norman Kemp Smith translation, 1929, St. Martin's, first edition, 1965).
- 26 Ibid. 119-120.
- 27 Lewis White Beck transl, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, , Bobbs-Merrill, 1950, pp.6-259).
- 28 Norman Kemp Smith translation, (St Martin's Press, 1965), p.301

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